CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-ZONING

AND

FIRST AMENDMENT-

ORDINANCE PROHIBITING OPERATION OF AN ADULT THEATER
IN A RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT-City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S.Ct.

925 (1986).
Prohibiting governmental action which suppresses the free
expression of ideas is a fundamental tenet of democracy.'
Voltaire aptly characterized our country's adherence to this principle when he said "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."12 The importance
accorded the free dissemination of ideas that inspired Voltaire's
immortal comment was recently tempered in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. 3 In City of Renton, the United States
Supreme Court balanced a theater owner's right to operate an
adult theater against the community's desire to preserve the
quality of its neighborhood. 4 The Renton Court held that the
community's ability to isolate the location of adult theaters did
not abrogate the first amendment rights of the theater owners. 5
The city of Renton has a population of 32,000 and is located
south of Seattle, Washington. 6 In May 1980, Renton's City
Council considered the advisability of enacting zoning legislation
intended to restrict the location of adult entertainment facilities. 7
The Council submitted the issue to the city's Planning and Development Committee and public hearings were initiated.8 As part
of its research, the Committee reviewed studies conducted in Seattle and other cities confronted with similar zoning dilemmas.9
I A.N. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS (1933).
2 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (quoting S. TALLENTRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907)).
3 106 S.Ct. 925, 932 (1986). The'City of Renton prohibited an adult motion
picture theater from locating within 1000 feet of a residential community. Id.

4 See id. at 930.

5 Id. at 932. The Renton majority restricted an adult theater from operating in
proximity to a residential community by upholding the city's zoning interests as
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I. provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law . . .prohibiting the free
exercise [of speech] .. "
6 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 927.
7 Id. For more detailed information, see Joint Appendix at 35-37, City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986) [hereinafter cited as.Joint Ap-

pendix] (affidavit of Jack R. Burns, Jan. 27, 1982).
8 City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 927.

9 Id. For more detailed information regarding the public hearings and the
studies conducted, see Joint Appendix, supra note 7, at 161-209 (deposition of

David R. Clemens, March 4, 1982).

925

926

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:925

In April 1981, the City Council, acting pursuant to the Planning and Development Committee's recommendation, enacted
an ordinance which, inter alia, prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone.' ° There were no
adult theaters located in Renton when the ordinance was passed
nor were any contemplated." The effect of the ordinance was to
confine adult theaters to a 520-acre area already occupied by a
an
sewage disposal site and treatment plant, a horse racing track,
2
industrial park, an oil tank farm, and a shopping center.'
In early 1982, Playtime Theaters, Inc. [Playtime] purchased
two existing theaters in Renton where they intended to show
adult films.'

3

The theaters were situated within the area prohib-

ited by the ordinance.' 4 Thereafter, Playtime attacked the ordinance on first and fourteenth amendment grounds.' 5 The
theater owners sought to establish the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance and to permanently enjoin its enforcement.' 6 Following a magistrate's recommendation, the district court granted a
preliminary injunction which permitted the respondents to show
adult films at the theaters.' 7 The court stated that there was no
factual basis showing a need for the ordinance and that it merely
reflected the community's distaste for adult films.'" Shortly
10 City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 927. The Renton ordinance prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone or single or multiple
family dwelling, any school or religious institution, or any public park or area zoned
for such use. Id. For similar zoning ordinances as that adopted by Renton, see
Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 78a-80a, 99a-139a, City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Statement] (Detroit and Seattle zoning ordinances are set forth in their entirety).
I I City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 927. Resolution No. 2368, enacted in October,
1980, states that the City does not, at the present time, have any business whose
primary purpose is the sale, rental, or showing of sexually explicit materials. See
Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 42.
12 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). The court of appeals noted that a substantial part of
the 520 acres zoned for adult theaters was already occupied.
13 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 927 (1986). Playtime was the same company that had operated adult theaters in Seattle, Tacoma,
and at least three other cities in the State of Washington'. SeeJoint Appendix, supra
note 8, at 294.
'4 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 927.
15 Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part that "no state shall...
abridge the privileges of citizens . . . nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny . . . equal protection of the
laws ..
"
16 City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 927.
17 See id. at 928.
18 Id.
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thereafter, the district court vacated the preliminary injunction,
denied the respondent's requested permanent injunction, and
entered summary judgment in favor of Renton.' 9
The district court held that the Renton ordinance did not
substantially restrict first amendment interests because the restrictions on speech were no greater than necessary to further the
governmental interest involved. 20 The court stated that in formulating its ordinance, Renton was justified in relying on the
zoning experiences of other cities. 2 ' The court further noted
that the ordinance was not meant to censor films,
but to mitigate
22
the impact of adult theaters on the community.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
ruled that the Renton ordinance substantially restricted first
amendment interests. 23 The court stated that the city could not
justify its substantial infringement of expression by relying on
studies performed by other cities in regulating adult theaters.24
In order properly to establish a substantial governmental interest, the court asserted that Renton should have studied the effects of such theaters on their own community.2 5 Moreover, the
court opined that Renton's
motivating factor was to control the
26
films.
the
of
content
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that the ordinance did not ban adult
theaters altogether.2 7 The Court held that the city's pursuit of
zoning interests was unrelated to the suppression of free expres19 Id. Playtime asserted that summary judgment was improper because they had
relied on the district court's findings on the preliminary injunction in entering into
a stipulation. Playtime further argued that when the district court altered its findings of fact, it created a material issue of fact which would render summary judgment improper. The court of appeals did not sustain Playtime's argument. See
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 11, at 15a, n.12.
20 See City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 928.
21 Id.

22 Id.
23 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986). The court found that Renton's justifications for the

restriction were "conclusory and speculative" since it neither studied the effects of
adult theaters nor did it apply such findings to the city's problems. Id.
24 Id. at 537. The court observed that the experiences of Detroit and Seattle
were not sufficiently relevant because the purpose of the Detroit ordinance was to

disperse adult theaters throughout the city, while the Seattle ordinance was intended to concentrate such theaters in one area. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 925. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres,

Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976).
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sion. 28 The Court further held that Renton was entitled to rely
on studies and experiences produced by other cities despite the
fact that such studies did not specifically relate to Renton's
unique problems. 29 Finally, the Court recognized that the ordinance also allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication since there remained a limited area of land left open for
such theaters. 0
In determining the validity of a regulation that arguably impinges upon first amendment rights, the United States Supreme
Court has traditionally engaged in a two-part analysis. 3 ' First,
the reviewing court should ascertain whether the regulation is an
attempt to suppress one's freedom of expression. 2 Even if the
court determines that a form of expression is in fact being repressed, the restriction will still be upheld if that form of expression is unprotected by the first amendment.33 If, however, the
regulated expression carries first amendment protections, a court
should analyze whether the incidental restrictions on speech are
outweighed by significant governmental interests.3 4 Second, a
court should determine whether the restriction leaves open ample, alternative means for communicating the message. 5
In United States v. O'Brien,3 6 the Court fashioned a four-part
test to determine when a governmental interest is sufficiently important to justify a restriction on expression. 7 In O'Brien, the
defendant burned his draft card in protest of the Vietnam War. 8
He subsequently was convicted of violating a statute which prohibited the destruction of draft cards.3 9 The defendant appealed
his conviction on the ground that the statute restricted his free28 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision. Id.
29 Id. at 931.
30 Id. at 932.
31 N. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUrIONAL LAW, § 16.47 at 970
(1986) [hereinafter cited as Nowak, Rotunda & Young].
32 See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 3 1, at 970.
33 Id.
34 Id. See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
35 See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 31, at 970.
36 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
37 Id. at 377.
38 Id. at 369. FBI agents witnessed O'Brien and his three companions burning
small white cards. Id. They subsequently discovered that the card burned was
O'Brien's registration certificate. Id. at n.l.
39 Id. at 370. O'Brien violated § 462(b) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948 which was directed to any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys or knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
certificate ......

1987]

NOTES

929

dom of expression. 40 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the conviction asserting that the government's interest in preserving documentation regarding armed service's eligibility was
paramount to the defendant's interest of freedom of
expression. 4
The Court created a four-part test to determine when expression justifiably may be regulated by a governmental interest.4 2 The Court explained that a regulation may suppress
expression if: "it is within the constitutional power of the Government; it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free-expression; and the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
44
of that interest. 43 Applying this time, place, and manner test,
the Court recognized that since the Military Training and Service
Act was designed to maintain and to support the armed forces,
the first and second requirements of the test were satisfied.4 5
The Court was also convinced that the third and fourth prongs of
the test were not violated because the statute was designed to
facilitate the functioning of the Selective Service, and not to suppress communication. 46
The Court has employed the time, place and manner analysis of O'Brien when free expression is arguably impinged by a municipality's zoning ordinance.4 7 In Nortown Theaters Inc. v.
Gribbs,41 theater owners challenged Detroit's ordinance which
prohibited "adult" businesses within 500 feet of a single unit
40 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370. The issue of the constitutionality of the Act was
raised by O'Brien's counsel at a pretrial motion. At trial and upon sentencing,
O'Brien appeared pro se. Id.
41 Id. at 377.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 378-80. Under traditional time, place, and manner analysis, the initial
inquiry is whether a regulation affecting protected expression is content-based or
content-neutral. If content-based, the regulation is strictly scrutinized and upheld
only if it serves a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980) (Public Service Commission order
that prohibited Consolidated Edison from including in their bill inserts discussing
controversial issues violated first amendment). If content-neutral, the regulation
receives lesser scrutiny and is upheld if it serves a substantial government interest
and leaves open alternative channels of communication. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 12-2 (1978).
45 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-79.
46 Id. at 379-80.
47 See, e.g.,
Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (1974),
48 373 F. Supp. 363 (1974).
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dwelling room. 4 9 The intended purpose of the ordinance was to
prevent the deleterious effects of such businesses on surrounding
neighborhoods. 5' The United States District Court for the District of Michigan found that this interest did not qualify as a compelling state interest and, accordingly, held the ordinance
violative of the equal protection clause. 5 ' The court also observed that the ordinance restricted first amendment freedoms
more than necessary to maintain and to preserve residential
neighborhoods.5 2 The court highlighted the fact that adult theaters and bookstores often were found to affect neighborhoods
adversely. 53 Accordingly, the Gribbs court held that a municipality has a right to require that particular businesses be located at
specified distances from one another.5 4
Two years later, in 1976, the Court decided the landmark
case of Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc.5 5 In Young, the operator of an adult movie theater challenged an ordinance which
mandated dispersed locations of adult entertainment establishments and prohibited their operation within 500 feet of a residential area.5 6 N
The Young majority initially recognized that the ordinance
categorized adult entertainment establishments by their subject
matter.5 7 The Court, however, stated that there would be no significant restriction of the access to such theaters and that the
city's interest in deterring urban decay was a legitimate reason
for the regulation of theater location. 58 The Young Court further
noted that the ordinance only imposed a minimal burden on protected speech. 5 9 The Court next asserted that a municipality may
control the location of commercial establishments either by confining them to specified commercial zones or by dispersing them
Id. at 366.
Id.
51 Id. at 371.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 369.
54 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (ordinance
which dispersed the location of adult movie theaters upheld).
55 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
56 Id. at 52 n.2.
57 Id. at 63.
58 Id. at 60-63.
59 Id. at 62-63. See, e.g., People ex rel Carey v. Starview Drive-In Theater, Inc.;
100 Ill. App. 3d 624, 427 N.E.2d 201, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1113 (1981) (county
ordinance provision forbade outdoor theater licensee from projecting scenes portraying sexually explicit nudity).
49
50
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throughout the city. 60 Accordingly, the Court found that reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner of protected speech is
permitted by the first amendment where such regulations are rea6
sonably necessary to further significant interests. '
In 1978, the Court again elaborated the time, place, and
manner test set out in O'Brien.62 In Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of
Seattle,63 an ordinance mandated the concentration of all adult
motion picture theaters in certain downtown areas. 64 Theater
owners sought to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional
and alleged violations of their first amendment rights. 6 5 The City
of Seattle asserted that it had a significant interest in maintaining
the character of its neighborhoods. 66 The Court weighed Seattle's interest in preserving neighborhood character against the
restrictions on free speech and held in favor of the city.6 7 The
Court also relied on studies conducted by Seattle concerning the
pernicious effects of adult theaters on surrounding communities
and, as a result, concluded that the ordinance served a significant
governmental interest. 6 8 As evidenced by the Northend Cinema
Court, a city may demonstrate their compelling interest in regulating adult entertainment facilities by relying on past empirical
studies concerning the problematic effects of adult theaters in
communities. 69
Shortly after Northend Cinema, the Court considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that banned all live entertainment in a commercial zone. 7" In Schad v. Borough of Mount
Young, 427 U.S. at 58-61.
See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on noise near
school which disturbs school session); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban
on demonstrations in or near courthouse designed to obstruct justice); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (limitation on use of sound trucks).
62 See Northend Cinema, Inc., v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153
(1978).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 710, 585 P.2d at 1154.
65 Id. at 712, 585 P.2d at 1156.
66 Id. at 715, 585 P.2d at 1159.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 712 n.2, 585 P.2d at 1156, n.2. But see Evansville Book Mart, Inc. v. City
of Indianapolis, 477 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (discretion of city controller to
consider the effects of adult theaters on surrounding communities was unconstitutional without more definite guiding standards).
'7o See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The purpose of
the ordinance was to encourage shopping-center developments and to concentrate
commercial uses into few locations. Id. at 64.
60
61
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Ephraim,7 ' an adult bookstore wanted to install a coin-operated
machine which would allow a customer to view a live, nude
dancer.72 The Court initially observed that there was insufficient
posed
evidence to justify the conclusion that live entertainment
.
73
73
significant problems to surrounding communities. The Court
also noted that even if the ordinance served a significant interest,
it failed to provide an alternative forum for the entertainment.
Accordingly, the Schad Court invalidated the ordinance on the
ground that it was both overbroad and violative of the first
amendment.7 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that if a motivating factor in enacting a regulation is to suppress expression,
the restriction presumptively violates the first amendment.76 In
the 1983 case Tovar v. Billmeyer,7 7 the petitioners attempted to
open an adult bookstore in a commercial zone.7 8 At a special
meeting held without notice to the prospective store owners, the
city council passed two zoning enactments. 79 These enactments
prevented the petitioners from operating their adult theater and
bookstore.8 0 The petitioners alleged that the city's zoning enactments were motivated by a desire to suppress first amendment
expression. 8 ' The ninth circuit observed that the enactment was
per se unconstitutional because its real purpose was to obstruct
the exercise of protected first amendment rights. 82 The court
noted that any decision designed to restrict first amendment freedoms should be strictly scrutinized.8 3 Applying this rationale,
the Tovar court concluded that communication cannot be cur71
72
73

452 U.S. 61 (1981).
Id. at 62.

Id. at 73. The Court also noted that the ordinance excludes all live entertainment and not simply nude dancing. Id. at 74. The Court concluded that the regulation therefore was -not narrowly-tailored. Id.
74 Id. at 75-76. Although nude dancing was available in near-by towns, the
Court noted that there was no evidence to support the proposition that the theater
owners offered the same kind of entertainment. Id. at 76.
75

Id. at 74.

76
77
78
79

See Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983).
721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1262.
Id.

80 Id.

Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
83 Id. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
536 (1980) (Public Service Commission order that prohibited Consolidated Edison
from including inserts discussing controversial issues in their bills violated first
amendment).
81
82
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tailed simply because public officials disagree with the speaker's
views. 84
In 1983, the Supreme Court restructured the O'Brien test in a
case unrelated to zoning.8 5 In United States v Grace,86 two individuals were arrested for distributing leaflets and carrying picket
signs on the sidewalk in front of the United States Supreme
Court building.8 7 The arrestees sought declaratory relief, alleging that the statute which prohibited their actions violated their
first amendment rights. 88 The Grace majority announced a threepart test to determine the constitutionality of the statute, 89 which
resembled the test used in O'Brien to analyze similar time, place
and manner regulations.9 0 The Grace Court succinctly stated that
a regulation is constitutional if the restrictions are "content-neutral, 9 1 are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication". 92 The Court then found that the statute banned constitutionally protected activity on the public sidewalks and,
therefore, would leave the petitioners with no effective means to
convey their view. 93 The majority further recognized that while
the statute was content-neutral, it did not serve a significant governmental interest. 94 Accordingly, the Court held the statute to
be unconstitutional.95
In City of Whittier v. Walnut Properties, Inc. ,96 a California appellate court in a zoning case reiterated the tripartite test of
84 Tovar, 721 F.2d at 1265. See, e.g., Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d
1345, 1347 (1982) (evidence demonstrated that basic purpose of zoning ordinance
was to control expression).
85 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
86 461 U.S. 171
87

Id. at 173.

Id. at 174. The statute provided that "it shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or
move in procession or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or
to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into
public notice any party, organization, or movement." Id. at 173 n. 1.
88

89

Id. at 177.

90 Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.

171, 177 (i983) (statute which
banned petitioners from distributing leaflets on public sidewalk found unconstitutional) with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (statute which prohibited burning of draft card found constitutional).
91 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussion of content-neutrality).
92 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
93 Id. at 181.
94 Id. at 181 n.10.
95 Id. at 183.
96 149 Cal. App. 3d 633, 197 Cal. Rptr. 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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Grace.9 7 In City of Whittier, Walnut Properties owned a theater
whose intended use was arguably "adult." '9 8 The city brought
suit to compel Walnut Properties' compliance with a zoning ordinance that prohibited the operation of any adult business located
within city limits.9 9 Using the guidelines formally announced in
Grace, the court observed that the first step would be to determine whether the ordinance preserved alternative methods of
communication.' ° ° The court noted that if the city required the
theater to relocate and did not ban the theater entirely, the first
amendment would not be violated. 01' However, the court found
that no evidence was introduced on the issue of an alternative
site for the theater.' 2 In addition, the court asserted that the city
had failed to prove that the ordinance was narrowly drawn to advance a significant governmental interest without impinging on
the freedom of speech.' 0 3 The court remanded the case leaving
open the issue of whether other areas for theater operation
existed.' 0 4
It was against this background of development and change
in the zoning of adult entertainment facilities that the City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 105 litigation arose. In Renton, the
Court endorsed the rationale of Young. '0 6 The Court examined
whether the Renton ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and whether it allowed for reasonable
97 Id. at 640, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The court stated that "the regulation must
be narrowly tailored to further the state's legitimate interest." Id. "[It] must also
leave open alternative channels of communication." Id.
98 Id. at 643, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The theater owner had argued that the
dominant theme of the films was not "adult" and was not proscribed by the ordinance. Id. The court remanded the case leaving open the issue of whether the
status of the theater was in fact "adult". Id. at 643, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
99 Id. at 647, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 640, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The parties had filed a "Stipulation" regarding the availability of other locations for the theater. Id. However, the record on
appeal indicated no ruling as to the "Stipulation." Id. at 643, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
101 Id. at 640, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The court observed the holding of American
Mini Theatres which rejected the notion that if adult theaters are dispersed throughout the city, the first amendment was violated.
102 Id. at 643, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
103 Id. at 646, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 137. The court succinctly stated that "the city
must buttress its assertion with evidence that the state interest has a basis in fact
and that the factual basis was considered in passing the ordinance." Id.
104 Id.
105 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986).
106 City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 928. Renton's ordinance targeted adult theaters
while the ordinance in Young only added adult theaters to a list of other regulated
adult establishments which included hotels, pool halls, and public lodging houses.
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 52 n.3.
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alternative avenues of communication. °7 Moreover, the Court
extended the rationale of Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle' 08 to entitle Renton to rely on the experiences of nearby Seattle and other
cities in enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance.' 0 9
Writing for the majority, "oJustice Rehnquist observed that
the Renton ordinance should be properly analyzed as a time, place
and manner regulation since it did not prohibit adult theaters altogether."' The Justice began his analysis of the Renton ordinance by using the Grace three-part test. 1 2 The majority
declared that the line drawn by the Renton ordinance was justified by the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhood. 1 13 The Renton Court stated that the ordinance merely

limited the place where adult films could be exhibited and did
not focus on the nature of the films. 1 4 Justice Rehnquist opined
that the predominate intent behind the ordinance was to prevent

crime, to protect trade, and to maintain property values, 1' 5 and
as such concluded that these objectives were unrelated to the

suppression of speech. 1 6 Accordingly, the Court held that the
ordinance furthered the substantial governmental interest in
maintaining residential neighborhoods. 1 7 In so finding, the Renton Court accepted the district court's conclusion that the Renton
ordinance was not directed at the content of films shown at adult
theaters, but rather, at the secondary effects such theaters have
' 8
on the surrounding community.
The Renton majority next addressed the question of whether
107

City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 927-28.

108 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978). The record in Northend Cinema pro-

vides extensive testimony regarding the pernicious effects of adult movie theater
locations on residential neighborhoods. Id. at 719, 585 P.2d at 1159.
109 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 930-31.
110 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor
joined injustice Rehnquist's opinion; Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 926.
' 1 Id. at 928-29.
112 Id. at 928.
113 Id. at 930.
114 Id. at 929-31.
115 Id. at 932. For an elaborate statement of reasons for enacting the ordinance,
see Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 10, at 5a.
116 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929.
117 Id. at 929-31.
118 Id. at 929. Although the Court disregarded whether the ordinance regulated
obscene speech, the Court's failure to rely on any obscenity case is demonstrative
that the holding only addresses sexually explicit, non-obscene speech. In addition,
the court of appeals recognized that the obscenity issue was moot. City of Renton,
748 F.2d at 534 n.10.
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Renton's ordinance permitted reasonable alternative avenues of
communication. " 9 Justice Rehnquist noted that the area zoned
for adult uses was arguably not commercially viable,' 20 but
stated, however, that the first amendment only required that the
respondent be afforded a reasonable opportunity to operate an
adult theater within the city. 12 ' The Renton Court was not con-

cerned with the economic impact of the ordinance, but the effect
it had upon the freedom of expression. 22 Accordingly, the Justice found that the ordinance 23did not unreasonably limit alternate
avenues of communication.

The Renton majority next rejected the court of appeals' assertion that a motivating factor behind the City Council's decision to
enact the ordinance was to restrict the respondents' first amendment rights. 124 The majority observed that Renton could have
either limited the number of adult theaters or banned them entirely if it desired to restrict the message the theaters
purveyed. 25 Although the Renton ordinance failed to regulate
other kinds of adult businesses and was arguably underinclusive, 12 6 the Renton Court asserted that the city had not singled out
adult theaters for discriminatory treatment. 27 The Court
pointed out that no adult theaters, other than Playtime Theaters,
Inc., were located in Renton, or were contemplated at the time
the ordinance was adopted. 128 The Court, therefore, speculated
that if other adult businesses
were established, Renton could
29
amend its ordinance.

Finally, the Renton Court asserted that the city was entitled to
rely on the experiences of nearby Seattle regarding the deterioration of residential neighborhoods in which adult theaters are
present.13 0 The Court concluded that as the evidence Renton relied upon was reasonably relevant to its specific problem, new
119 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 932.
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
126 Id.
regulate
fects on

at 929.

at 931. The Renton ordinance regulated only adult theaters and failed to
other kinds of adult businesses, which arguably would produce similar efneighborhoods. Id.

Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 931-32.
130 Id. at 930-31.
127
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studies or independent evidence were unnecessary.'' Although
Renton chose a different remedy than Seattle, the Court stated
that the remedy was immaterial if the studies relied upon were
relevant. 13 2 Accordingly, the Renton Court found Renton's ordi33
nance not to be violative of the United States Constitution.

Justice Brennan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined, wherein he concluded that Renton's zoning
ordinance discriminatorily imposed restrictions on the location
of movie theaters. 13 4 Justice Brennan stated that the discrimination was based entirely on the content of the film. l3 5 The Justice

believed that the language of the ordinance, as well as a "dubious
legislative history," supported this contention.1 3 6 The dissent
conceded that Renton may arguably have a compelling reason to
regulate adult theaters, but that its method of implementation
was discriminatory. 13 7 In Justice Brennan's view, the selective
treatment accorded adult theaters evidenced Renton's greater
concern 8with the content of the film than with their secondary
3

effects. 1

Although the majority held that Renton was entitled to rely
on the experiences of other cities, Justice Brennan pointed out
13
that Renton never actually reviewed any of those studies.

9

Jus-

tice Brennan criticized the majority for its reliance on Northend
Cinema, 140 since Renton had not provided a sufficient basis for
ascertaining whether Seattle's experience was relevant.' 41 Justice
Brennan also found the Renton ordinance distinguishable from
42
the Detroit zoning ordinance upheld in American Mini Theatres. 1
The dissent believed that the city failed to adequately demonstrate how the community would be affected by the presence of
Id. at 931.
Id.
'33 Id. at 933.
134 Id. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'35 Id.
136 Id. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'37 Id.
138 Id. at 934-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'39 Id. at 935-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 935-37 (Brennan,J., dissenting). See, e.g., Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 709, 711, 585 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (1978) (describing Seattle zoning ordinance as culmination of extensive study and discussion).
141 City of Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 935-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The purpose of Detroit's ordinance was
to disperse adult theaters throughout the city, while the Seattle ordinance was intended to concentrate such theaters in one area. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976).
'3'
132
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43

an adult theater.
Finally, Justice Brennan asserted that even if the ordinance
was a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation,
under Grace, it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. 14 4 In addition, Justice Brennan noted
that the ordinance did not leave open alternative channels for
communication. 145 Justice Brennan observed that the Detroit
zoning ordinance scrutinized in Young, by contrast, contained no
indication that the locations available for adult businesses would
be seriously limited.' 4 6 Justice Brennan distinguished these facts
from the Renton ordinance which greatly limited the locations
available for adult businesses, 14 7 and concluded that the aggrieved theater owners would be forced to conduct their business
under a severe handicap not imposed upon other

establishments.

148

The United States Supreme Court has continually wrestled
with city zoning ordinances that attempt to regulate the location
of adult establishments. The Renton Court relied primarily upon
the rationale of Young. 14 9 The four separate opinions in Young, 1 5
however, had previously cast doubt upon its precedential force.
Indeed, since Young, only one federal circuit had sustained the
validity of a Renton-style ordinance on the merits.' 5 ' Unlike the
Court in Young, the Renton majority concluded that a zoning or14s City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 936-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144

Id. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
Id. at 938 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

145 Id. at 937-38 (Brennan,
146
147

148

Id:
Id.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger andJustices White
and Rehnquist. Although Justice Powell concurred, he found the regulation was
unrelated to the suppression of expression under the O'Brien test. See supra notes
36-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of O'Brien; see also O'Brien, 427 U.S. at
80-81 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, in dissent, interpreted the Young
decision as a variation of the Court's previous first amendment holdings. See
O'Brien, 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
151 Compare Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1210-12 (7th Cir. 1980)
(upholding ordinance requiring that adult establishments be separated by at least
500 feet) with CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir. 1983) (striking
down ordinance as severely restricting first amendment expression) and Alexander
v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936, 937-39 (8th Cir. 1983) (striking down ordinance as substantially restricting access to adult theaters and bookstores) and Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1212-17 (5th Cir. 1982) (striking
down ordinance as not narrowly tailored to achieve its purported goals because
adult theaters were confined to unattractive and inconvenient areas).
149
150
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dinance aimed solely at adult theaters was content-neutral. 52 In
addition, the Renton majority appeared willing to afford nonobscene, sexually explicit expression less first
amendment protec53
tion than other types of communication.
The Renton Court created the presumption that zoning ordinances which in fact regulate content may be classified as content-neutral if their goal is to deter the secondary effects of the
expression. 154 Assuming arguendo that the Renton ordinance was
facially content-neutral, it still regulated content for two reasons.
First, the motivating factor behind the ordinance was the City's
general distaste for the content of the expression. 55 Second,
since the ordinance was directed only at adult theaters, it was arguably underinclusive for failing to regulate
other types of ex156
effects.
deleterious
similar
having
pression
The Renton majority dismissed the motivating factor test endorsed by the court of appeals and relied alternatively on the test
of United States v. O'Brien.'57 O'Brien, however, was a symbolic
speech case and is thus questionable authority for the Court's position.' 58 The Renton Court further rejected the facial underinclusiveness of the ordinance when it asserted that Renton
subsequently could amend its ordinance to cover other adult establishments.' 59 From this reasoning, it is clear that the Renton
Court has departed from traditional first amendment analysis.
The Court, through circuitous reasoning, assumed that the
facially underinclusive Renton ordinance would subsequently be
City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929.
Id. at n.2.
The case cited by the Court to support its argument that the ordinance was
content-neutral were not precisely on point. For example, Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 299 (1984), dealt with symbolic speech and was
analyzed under the O'Brien test. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text for a
discussion of O'Brien. In addition, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), dealt with commercial
speech where a content-based regulation was struck down.
155 City of Renton, 748 F.2d at 537. See, e.g., Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260
(9th Cir. 1983) (ordinance with intent to suppress expression presumptively violated first amendment).
156 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 931.
157 Id. at 929. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
O'Brien.
158 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929. Legislative motive aside, the Renton ordinance on its face was content-based, whereas the O'Brien statute on its face was
content-neutral. See supra note 44 for a discussion of content-neutrality. This
point strongly suggests that O'Brien is questionable authority for the Court's
position.
159 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 931-32.
152
153
154
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amended to remedy its selectivity.' 60 In reality, an ordinance
aimed exclusively at an adult theater is illustrative evidence of a
content-based regulation. 161

In addition to the majority's unique holding regarding content-neutrality, it inferred that nonobscene, sexually explicit expression should be afforded less first amendment protection.
The Court, albeit in a footnote, suggested that the interest of society in protecting sexually explicit expression is less than the interest in protecting untrammeled political debate. 62 The
majority's statement can be interpreted to suggest a less stringent content-neutrality standard for ordinances regulating adult
theaters. 63 Thus, a zoning ordinance directed as some contrived
secondary effect may be reviewed as content-neutral. Alternatively, the footnote may be interpreted to suggest that in the future courts may evaluate content-neutrality similarly to the
Renton Court."6 The Renton majority disregarded the facial underinclusiveness of the ordinance and its questionable legislative
intent. 65 This is indicative of a Supreme Court that may be wavering in its commitment to treating all first amendment expression equally.
Justice Brennan was correct in observing that a zoning ordinance aimed exclusively at adult theaters could not be contentneutral. The majority, through circuitous reasoning, has fashioned a "special" rule for unpopular methods of expression. If a
city can support their restrictive ordinances with an arguably legitimate secondary effect, the majority will apply a lower level of
scrutiny. As Justice Brennan noted, this is clearly an abrogation
of the theater owner's first amendment rights.
The dissent persuasively asserted that the Renton ordinance
was clearly a content-based regulation. Justice Brennan's dissent
was a logical progression of the cases since United States v. O'Brien.
160 See, e.g., Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (striking
down ordinance that barred drive-in theaters from showing movies containing
nudity when visible from the street).
161 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (striking down
an ordinance restricting proximity between adult theaters and residential neighborhoods). See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Young.
162 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929 n.2 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
163 The dissent recognized this possible interpretation when it noted that the
Court's analysis is limited to businesses that show sexually explicit materials, and
does not affect prior holdings involving state regulation of other types of expression. Id. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
164 City of Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 929 n.2.
165 Id. at 929, 931-32.
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The Renton ordinance should have been struck down for two
reasons. First, as Justice Brennan aptly pointed out, Renton had
not demonstrated sufficiently the deleterious effects of adult theaters on its neighborhoods to establish a substantial governmental interest. Second, as Justice Brennan vehemently argued, the
ordinance failed to provide for alternative channels of communication as it effectively banned adult theaters from any appropriate site.
Since the first amendment was drafted, Americans have believed that in many respects it was paramount to all other constitutional interests. The United States Supreme Court in many
prior decisions has embraced this notion. Curiously, the nation's
highest Court has departed from precedent and determined that
certain modes of expression are unworthy of first amendment
protection. One would hope that this interpretation is limited to
the particular facts occurring in City of Renton and that there will
be no cross-over effect in other areas of first amendment jurisprudence.
Christopher L. Musmanno

